What Washington is Missing in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks
The recent collapse of Secretary of State John Kerry's Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts
unleashed the characteristic wave of criticism that predictably follows in the wake of such
setbacks. However, Secretary Kerry was not wrong to pursue Israeli-Palestinian peace - doing so
is in our interest and is an important element of American leadership in the region.
However, following the UN General Assembly’s November 2012 decision to grant the
Palestinian Authority (PA) ‘non-member observer state’ status President Mahmoud Abbas has
been less resolved during the negotiations. He faces a public encouraged by the decision and
convinced of their impending statehood, thus unwilling to support political horse-trading. Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu engaged with vigor but, facing the likelihood that Abbas
would reject the framework document, dooming it to immediate irrelevance, had little incentive
to incur the political cost of releasing Palestinian prisoners or blocking housing tenders. The
question, therefore, is not whether to have a peace process, but what approach can stabilize the
peace talks and increase long-term chances for producing an agreement. There are four
elements that the Obama administration should incorporate going forward.
First, there can be no substitute for direct engagement between the parties themselves.
Unable to obtain direct Israeli-Palestinian dialogue on final-status issues, Kerry substituted it
with parallel U.S.-Israel and U.S.-Palestinian discussions, however, this was artificial and gave
hollow results. Realistically, ensuring a direct dialogue means lowering the talks' profile and
accepting that progress will initially come on less divisive issues like economics and security. It
also means dispensing with overly-ambitious deadlines, and accepting that merely handing off a
healthy process to President Obama's successor in 2017 would be a worthwhile
accomplishment.
Second, a greater emphasis should be placed on Palestinian economic growth and
reform. Doing so helps Palestinians focus on what they stand to gain through peace, not just
what they believe they will lose. It also reassures Israelis that their Palestinian neighbor will not
be a failed state. The West Bank economy stagnated in 2013 after several years of growth, and
the PA's finances deteriorated. As the recent Arab uprisings demonstrate vividly, such
downturns and dashed expectations can prove deeply destabilizing.
Third, the United States should renounce the so-called "BDS movement," which calls for
boycott, divestment, and sanctions against Israel, rather than attempting to use the specter of
boycotts to spur Israel along. Israel is more likely to take risks when it feels secure. Furthermore,
damaging the Israeli economy hurts Palestinians as well. They are dependent on Israel
economically for employment and as an export market, meaning that Israeli economic
downturns reverberate painfully in the West Bank and Gaza.
Finally, as is the case with so many other issues, our peace efforts would benefit from
more robust engagement with Arab states. They can be a source of both aid and political cover
for Abbas, can marginalize rejectionists like Hamas, and can offer Israel better regional
integration. Secretary Kerry commendably persuaded the Arab League to amend the 2002 Arab
Peace Initiative to endorse land swaps, and should build on that success. The Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is not ripe to be solved, nor will it benefit right now from yet another high-level
diplomatic push. But that does not mean we should neglect it, and step back that much further
from regional leadership.